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“Through the treaties we reserved that which is most important to us as
a people: [t]he right to harvest salmon in our traditional fishing areas.
But today the salmon is disappearing because the federal government is
failing to protect salmon habitat. Without the salmon there is no treaty
right. We kept our word when we ceded all of western Washington to the
United States, and we expect the United States to keep its word.”
—Billy Frank, Jr.1
“The Lummi are salmon people; salmon is culture, and culture is
salmon.”
—Merle Jefferson, Sr.2
I. INTRODUCTION
As the effects of climate change manifest themselves in the
Pacific Northwest, salmon, and salmon-dependent northwest tribes, will
face the greatest hardships.3 For the tribes in and around the Salish Sea,
salmon are inextricably linked to identity. Salmon are not simply a way
of life—they are life.4 As United States District Judge George H. Boldt

1.
NW. INDIAN FISHERIES COMM’N, A REPORT FROM THE TREATY
INDIAN TRIBES IN WESTERN WASHINGTON: TREATY RIGHTS AT RISK: ONGOING
HABITAT LOSS, THE DECLINE OF THE SALMON RESOURCE, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR CHANGE 6 (July 14, 2011), available at http://nwifc.org/w/wp-content/uploads/
downloads/2011/08/whitepaper628finalpdf.pdf (quoting Billy Frank, Jr., former
Chairman, Nw. Indian Fisheries Comm’n).
2.
NAT’L MUSEUM OF THE AM. INDIAN, EDUC. OFFICE, BACKGROUND
INFORMATION ON THE LUMMI NATION 1, available at http://www.nmai.si.edu/
environment/pdf/07_01_Teacher_Background_Lummi.pdf (last visited Apr. 24,
2015) (quoting Merle Jefferson, Sr., Exec. Dir., Lummi Nation Natural Res. Dep’t).
3.
See Darryl Fears, As Salmon Vanish in the Dry Pacific Northwest,
So Does Native Heritage, WASH. POST (July 30, 2015), available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/as-salmon-vanish-in-the-dry-pacificnorthwest-so-does-native-heritage/2015/07/30/2ae9f7a6-2f14-11e5-8f36-18d1d5019
20d_story.html; see also NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, FACING THE STORM: INDIAN
TRIBES, CLIMATE-INDUCED WEATHER EXTREMES, AND THE FUTURE FOR INDIAN
COUNTRY 20 (2011), available at http://www.nwf.org/~/media/PDFs/GlobalWarming/Reports/ TribalLands_ExtremeWeather_Report.ashx.
4.
See CHARLES WILKINSON, MESSAGES FROM FRANK’S LANDING: A
STORY OF SALMON, TREATIES AND THE INDIAN WAY (2000).
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observed in his seminal decision on treaty-reserved fishing rights, “[t]he
symbolic acts [of the first-salmon ceremony], attitudes of respect and
reverence, and concern for the salmon reflect a ritualistic conception of
the interdependence and relatedness of all living things.”5 For the tribes
of the Pacific Northwest, “[s]almon is culture, and culture is salmon.”6
Salmon are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate
change. Climate change poses a perhaps insurmountable challenge to
salmon, already struggling to survive from the effects of overfishing,
development, and habitat degradation.7 As a cold-water fish, salmon are
particularly impacted by fluctuations in water temperature.8 As glaciers
and snow packs high in the North Cascades melt, the temperature of
mountain streams—the habitat vital for spawning grounds and juvenile
salmon—will increase.9 By 2080, scientists estimate that the average
water temperature of these mountain streams will rise to seventy degrees
Fahrenheit, a temperature lethal to juvenile salmon and salmon eggs.10
Between 2050 and 2100, scientists estimate that fifty percent of all
stream habitat for salmon will be lost.11 Rising temperatures and melting
snow packs also cause increased flooding, which, in turn, increases
sedimentation and scours away the gravel creek beds necessary for
“We have ceremonies for the first salmon of each run. We bring
everybody together and share the first salmon, and we train our
children that way. When we eat the salmon we give out offerings
to the fish and the river. We’re not separate from the river. Indian
people don’t have a cathedral. We have the land and the river.”
Id. at 99 (quoting Billy Frank, Jr.); see also Fears, supra note 3.
5.
United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 351 (W.D. Wash.
1974) [hereinafter Boldt Decision].
6.
NAT’L MUSEUM OF THE AM. INDIAN, supra note 2 (quoting Merle
Jefferson, Sr.).
7.
See Hal Bernton, Snowpack Drought Has Salmon Dying in
Overheated Rivers, SEATTLE TIMES (July 25, 2015), available at http://www.
seattletimes.com/seattle-news/environment/snowpack-drought-has-salmon-dying-inoverhea ted-rivers.
8.
See OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING AND EVALUATION, CLIMATE
CHANGE DIV., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ECOLOGICAL IMPACTS FROM CLIMATE
CHANGE: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FRESHWATER RECREATIONAL FISHING, EPA220-R-95-004 2-20, Exhibit 2-7 (1995), available at http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/Zy
PDF.cgi/40000F7W.PDF?Dockey=40000F7W.PDF
9.
NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, supra note 3, at 21.
10.
Katie Campbell & Saskia de Melker, Northwest ‘Salmon People’
Face Future with Less Fish, PBS NEWSHOUR (July 18, 2012), http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/updates/climate-change-july-dec12-swinomish_07-18/.
11.
NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, supra note 3, at 21 (citing OFFICE OF
POLICY, PLANNING AND EVALUATION, supra note 8, at 2-47, Exhibit 2-27).
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spawning habitat.12 As the sea levels rise and ocean temperatures
increase, salmon runs will move to new grounds and then disappear
completely.13
Between Seattle, Washington, and Vancouver, British Columbia,
sits the Lummi Indian Reservation, home to the Lummi Nation
(“Nation”). The Nation is nestled on a small peninsula jutting into the
northern reaches of Puget Sound, the northeastern waters of the San Juan
Islands, and the southern extent of the Straight of Georgia, waters
collectively known as the Salish Sea.14 In recent years, the Nation has
found itself at the center of a national and international debate over coal
production, economic development, climate change, and ecological and
cultural preservation.15
Just a stone’s throw to the north of the Nation’s reservation is
Xwe’chi’eXen,16 the site of the Cherry Point Refinery—the largest
refinery in Washington.17 It is also the proposed site of a coal and bulk
commodities export facility—the Gateway Pacific Terminal
(“Terminal”)—one of three sites in the Pacific Northwest proposed to
ship Montana and Wyoming coal to markets primarily in Asia.18 The
Nation has spearheaded efforts to block the construction of the Terminal
by enforcing its treaty-reserved right to take fish and its broader implied
12.
Id.
13.
Id.
14.
See generally Home, LUMMI NATION, http://www.lummi-nsn.org/
website/index2.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2015).
15.
See Richard Walker, Lummi Nation Asks Army Corps to Deny
Permit for Coal Export Terminal, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Jan.
1, 2015), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2015/01/08/lummi-nation-ask
s-army-corps-deny-permit-coal-export-terminal-158609.
16.
The Lummi call Cherry Point “Xwe’chi’eXen,” the Lummi word
for the mink that they used to hunt there. Xwe’chi’eXen is a culturally significant
landscape, revered by the Lummi. It is the home of the “Ancient Ones,” and
“honored by the Lummi people and their ancestors since the beginning of time for its
traditional, cultural, and spiritual significance.” LUMMI NATION AWARENESS
PROJECT, XWE’CHI’EXEN: A PLACE OF CULTURAL AND SPIRITUAL SIGNIFICANCE,
available at http://lnnr.lummi-nsn.gov/LummiWebsite/userfiles/281_FINALNovem
berSquolQuolAwarenessProject.pdf (last visited Jan. 12, 2016).
17.
Cherry Point Refinery, BRITISH PETROLEUM, http://www.bp.com/en
_us/bp-us/media-room/infographics/cherry-point-refinery.html (last visited Jan 7,
2016).
18.
See generally Hal Bernton & Brian M. Rosenthal, Demand Cools as
Fight Rages over Coal-Export Terminals, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 3, 2013), available
at http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/demand-cools-as-fight-rages-over-coalexport-terminals. The other proposed terminals, both on the Columbia River, are the
Coyote Island Terminal in Boardman, Oregon, and the Millennium Bulk Terminals
in Longview, Washington.
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right to habitat protection.19 The Nation has cited the adverse impacts the
Terminal could potentially have on traditional fisheries—including the
construction of a new loading dock, increased shipping traffic,
shipwrecks and spills, and the effects of coal dust—as reasons for its
opposition.20 The Nation’s efforts to preserve its treaty rights,
sovereignty, and way of life by blocking the construction of the terminal,
however, conflicts with other tribes who view natural resource
development—especially coal—as key to their survival and preserving
their way of life.21 The fight over the Terminal, then, is a clash between
conflicting values, cultures, sovereigns, and views of the future.22 The
Nation’s ability to protect its way of life and block the construction of
the Terminal rests on its ability to reestablish the implied right to habitat
protection.

19.
Lummi Nation Officially Opposes Coal Export Terminal in Letter to
Army Corps of Engineers, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Aug. 2,
2013), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/08/02/lummi-nation-offici
ally-opposes-coal-export-terminal-letter-army-corps-engineers-150718. In its 2011
report on treaty rights, Treaty Rights at Risk, the Northwest Indian Fisheries
Commission identified three major actions the federal government must take to
“remedy th[e] erosion of treaty-reserved rights,” including “protect[ing] and
restor[ing] western Washington treaty rights by better protecting habitat.” NW.
INDIAN FISHERIES COMM’N, supra note 1, at 5 (emphasis added).
20.
See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, WASH. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY &
WHATCOM CNTY., SCOPING SUMMARY REPORT, at Appendix 1 – Native American
Tribes Scoping Comments (Mar. 29, 2013), available at http://www.eisgate
waypacificwa.gov/sites/default/files/content/files/Appendix_I_Tribes.pdf; see also
Richard Walker, The Case Against Coal Terminals: Lummi Cite Heath,
Environmental Factors, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Feb. 27, 2015),
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2015/02/27/case-against-coal-terminals
-lummi-cite-health-environmental-factors-159382; see also Richard Walker, Lummi
Call Coal Terminals an Absolute No-Go, Invoking Treaty Rights, INDIAN COUNTRY
TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Feb. 26, 2015), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.
com/2015/02/26/lummi-call-coal-terminals-absolute-no-go-invoking-treaty-rights159381.
21.
See Amy Martin, Crow Tribe Says Coal Development Crucial to
Survival, INSIDE ENERGY, MONT. PUB. RADIO (Oct. 23, 2015), http://mtpr.org/
post/crow-tribe-says-coal-development-crucial-survival.
22.
“For Bill James, hereditary chief at Lummi, this fight isn’t over only
crab and salmon fishing grounds, but something bigger, schelangen, their people’s
way of life. Mitigation . . . doesn’t capture what would be lost if the last of this cove
was developed for industry.” Lynda V. Mapes, Northwest Tribes Unite Against
Giant Coal, Oil Projects, SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 16, 2016), available at http://www.
seattletimes.com/seattle-news/environment/northwest-tribes-unite-against-giant-coal
-oil-projects/ (emphasis in original).
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The Nation is a signatory to the Treaty of Point Elliot
(“Treaty”).23 In 1980, United States District Judge William H. Orrick, Jr.,
of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington, found that “[t]he right to take fish in usual and accustomed
grounds,”24 language found in every Stevens Treaty,25 implied a broader
right to habitat protection.26 The court concluded that in order to exercise
the right to take fish, there must exist fish to be taken.27 Axiomatic to the
survival and existence of the fish, the court concluded, was the need for a
healthy habitat.28 The court thus established the implied right to habitat
protection as an integral part of the Stevens Treaties and the so-called
23.
Treaty Between the United States and the Dwámish, Suquámish,
and other Allied and Subordinate Tribes of Indians in Washington Territory, Apr.
11, 1859, 12 Stat. 927 [hereinafter Treaty of Point Elliot].
24.
Treaty with the Nisqualli, Puyallup, etc. art. 3, Dec. 26, 1854, 10
Stat. 1132 [hereinafter Treaty of Medicine Creek]; see Treaty of Point Elliot, supra
note 23, at art. V.
25.
Between 1854 and 1855, Washington Territory Governor Isaac I.
Stevens penned and signed six treaties between the United States and the tribes in
the Pacific Northwest. These treaties are known as the “Stevens Treaties,” and
contain nearly identical language concerning the reservation of fishing rights.
COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, § 18.04[2][e][iii], 1169 nn.38-39
(Nell Jessup Newton, ed., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK]; see generally
Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S.
658, 662 n.2 (1979) [hereinafter Fishing Vessel]; see also United States v.
Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187, 189 n.2. (W.D. Wash. 1980) [hereinafter
Washington III]. The Stevens Treateis include: Treaty of Point Elliot, supra note 23,
at art. V; Treaty of Medicine Creek, supra note 24, at art. 3; Treaty Between the
United States of America and the S’Klallam Indians art. IV, Apr. 29, 1859, 12 Stat.
933 [hereinafter Treaty of Point No Point]; Treaty Between the United States of
American and the Makah Tribe of Indians art. IV, Apr. 18, 1859, 12 Stat. 939
[hereinafter Treaty of Neah Bay]; Treaty Between the United States and the Yakima
Nation of Indians art. III, Apr. 18, 1859, 12 Stat. 951 [hereinafter Treaty with the
Yakimas]; Treaty Between the United States and the Qui-nai-elt and Quil-leh-ute
Indians art. III, Apr. 11, 1859, 12 Stat. 971 [hereinafter Treaty of Olympia]. Similar
language is found in three other treaties signed and penned by Governor Stevens:
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Nez Percé Indians art. III, Apr.
29, 1859, 12 Stat. 957 [hereinafter Nez Perce Treaty of 1855]; Treaty Between the
United States and the Flathead, Kootenay, and Upper Pend d’Oreilles Indians art. III,
Apr. 18, 1859, 12 Stat. 975 [hereinafter Treaty of Hellgate]; Treaty Between the
United States and the Walla-Walla, Cayuses, and Umatilla Tribes and Bands of
Indians in Washington and Oregon Territories art. I, Apr. 11, 1859, 12 Stat. 945
[hereinafter Walla Walla Treaty].
26.
Washington III, 506 F. Supp. at 189 n.1 (interpreting Treaty of
Medicine Creek, supra note 24, at art. III).
27.
Id. at 203.
28.
Id. at 205.
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Fishing Clause.29 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, however, reversed, concluding that the Treaties did not imply a
broader right to habitat protection.30
If reestablished, the implied right could provide tribes with a tool
to proactively challenge projects that would affect their usual and
accustomed fishing grounds. In this way, the Nation could use the
implied right to halt the construction of the Terminal—or any other
project—before it even began. In the decades since the Ninth Circuit
rejected the establishment of the implied right, the climate and the reality
of declining fisheries has changed, and the law and attitudes towards
tribal involvement have evolved, providing the Nation—and other
tribes—with the opportunity to reestablish the implied right to habitat
protection.31 This paper examines the development of the implied right to
habitat protection, the need for the right, its impacts on the state and the
economy, and its standard of liability. This paper attempts to create a
blueprint by which the Nation can reestablish the implied right to habitat
protection and use it to halt the construction of the Terminal.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO TAKE FISH
In the Pacific Northwest, the Fishing Clauses in the Stevens
Treaties recognizes the essential importance of fishing. In signing these
treaties, the tribes viewed the reservation of fishing rights as the
consideration for which they would cede their historic homelands to the
United States.32 In particular, the Nation signed the Treaty of Point Elliot
in 1855.33 Article Five of the Treaty provides:
[t]he right of taking fish at usual and accustomed
grounds and stations is further secured to said Indians
in common with all citizens of the Territory, and of
erecting temporary houses for the purpose of curing,
together with the privilege of hunting and gathering
roots and berries on open and unclaimed lands.
29.
Id. at 203.
30.
United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 1374, 1380 (9th Cir. 1982)
[hereinafter Washington IV].
31.
See infra Section III.
32.
See O. Yale Lewis, III, Comment, Treaty Fishing Rights: A Habitat
Right as Part of the Trinity of Rights Implied by the Fishing Clause of the Stevens
Treaties, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 281 (2003) (“[t]his was the consideration for which
they ceded essentially all of their aboriginal territory to non-Indians.” Id. at 307).
33.
Treaty of Point Elliot, supra note 23.
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Provided, however, that they shall not take shell-fish
from any beds staked or cultivated by citizens.34
In the Pacific Northwest, nearly every treaty between the United States
and Indian nations reserved to the tribes the right to fish in their usual
and accustomed places.35
The right reserved in the treaties is not the right for the mere
opportunity to catch fish, but the right to actually take and harvest fish.36
The Supreme Court of the United States has rejected the interpretation
that the Stevens Treaties merely granted tribes the right to an “equal
opportunity” to take fish.37 Instead, the Supreme Court has interpreted
the treaties as reserving tribes the right to take—or harvest—fish.38 This
right extends to “every fishing location where members of a tribe
customarily fished from time to time at and before treaty times.”39 These
rights are not grants to the tribes, but are instead reservations of rights
existing before the treaties.40
A. The Right to Cross and Occupy: United States v. Winans
In United States v. Winans, the seminal case on the right to take
fish, the Supreme Court found that tribes’ right to take fish extended off
their reservations.41 At the turn of the Twentieth Century, the Winans
brothers operated a fish wheel42 on the banks of the Columbia River with
a permit from the State of Washington.43 The Winans’ operation created
a monopoly over the fish in the Columbia River.44 The United States
sued the brothers on behalf of the Yakima Nation for violating the
34.
Id. art. V (emphasis added).
35.
See supra note 25.
36.
Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 678.
37.
Id. (emphasis added).
38.
Id.
39.
Boldt Decision, 384 F. Supp. at 332.
40.
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
41.
Id.
42.
A fish wheel is a waterwheel-like structure that is placed on a river
and supported by a dock or barge. A revolving arm with baskets and paddles is
attached to a rim, which rotates in the current of the river. The baskets dip into the
river and are pushed out by the current, scooping up passing fish. The fish are then
tilted out into a hopper as the baskets crest and dip back into the water. A channel is
created in the river to funnel fish into the path of the fish wheel’s baskets. See
generally Catching Salmons with Fish Wheels, AMUSING PLANET (May 28, 2015),
http://www.amusingplanet.com/2015/05/catching-salmons-with-fish-wheels.html.
43.
Winans, 198 U.S. at 382.
44.
Id.
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Yakima’s treaty rights, accusing them of harvesting most of the passing
fish and denying any substantial harvest to Yakima fishermen.45
Employing the Indian law canons of construction,46 the Supreme
Court determined that at the time the treaty was signed, the Yakima
Nation understood its right to fish as extending beyond its reservation.47
The Court recognized that the right to fish off the reservation was
implied within the broader meaning of the treaty.48 Moreover, the Court
determined that the right to take fish off-reservation created an easement
over private and state land.49 The right “impose[s] a servitude upon every
piece of land as though described therein.”50 This easement supersedes
any state or private action attempting to block Indian access to traditional
fishing grounds.51 Additionally, the Court viewed this easement, and the
right to fish generally, as a property interest held by the tribe in common
with its members.52 The Court determined that the treaty conveyed to the
Tribe certain rights in property, specifically, “the right to cross [the land]
to the river” and “the right to occupy [the land] for the purpose” of
fishing.53 While the Court recognized that the tribes retained exclusive
fishing rights within their reservations, the “right outside of those
boundaries [was] reserved ‘in common with citizens of the territory.’”54
Indians and tribes did not retain an exclusive right to fish at usual and
accustomed fishing grounds off-reservation.55

45.
Id. at 377.
46.
The Indian law canons of construction prescribe that treaties,
statutes, and executive orders are to be interpreted as tribes would have understood
them at the time they were signed, and that ambiguities are to be construed in favor
of tribes. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at § 2.02[1], 113-15.
47.
Winans, 198 U.S. at 380.
48.
Id. at 381.
49.
Id.
50.
Id.
51.
COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at § 18.04[2][f], 1174 (citing
Winans, 198 U.S. at 381-82). Indeed, in certain instances courts have found that
fishing rights extend the tribe the right to moor fishing vessels uninterrupted. See
Grand Travers Band of Ottowa & Chippewa Indians v. Dir., Mich. Dep’t of Natural
Res., 141 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 1998).
52.
Winans, 198 U.S. at 381; see generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra
note 25, at § 18.04[1], 1164.
53.
Winans, 198 U.S. at 381.
54.
Id.
55.
The Treaty of Point Elliot and the Stevens Treaties use the term
“usual and accustomed grounds.” This paper uses that term interchangeably with
“traditional fisheries.”
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B. Equal Sharing: United States v. Washington—The Boldt Decision
In the seventy years following the Winans decision, the
commercial fishing industry in Washington exploded.56 Large-scale
commercial fishing placed increasing pressure on the smaller Native
fishing operations.57 The loss in harvest for tribes was particularly acute,
as fish provided income and food, and were the center of religious and
cultural identity, causing tribes to push back against what they saw as
infringements on their treaty rights.58 Under pressure, the United States
initiated a two-phase series of litigation against Washington in 1970 to
determine the precise scope of the right to take fish.59 “Phase I” dealt
with the allocation of fish allowed to be harvested by Native and nonNative fishermen in usual and accustomed places.60 “Phase II” dealt with
whether hatchery-raised fish were to be included in the allocation and
whether the right to fish implied a right to habitat protection.61
In United States v. Washington, known as the Boldt Decision,
Judge Boldt found that the phrase “in common with” used in the Stevens
Treaties reserved for the tribes the right to take fifty percent of all fish
harvested in usual and accustomed grounds off-reservation.62 Judge
Boldt explained:
it is incumbent upon [the State] to take all appropriate
steps within [its] actual abilities to assure as nearly as
possible an equal sharing of the opportunity for treaty
and non-treaty fishermen to harvest every species of fish
to which the treaty tribes has access at their usual and
accustomed fishing places.63
The Ninth Circuit agreed, stating that Judge Boldt’s “50-50 [sic]
apportionment . . . best effectuates what the Indian parties would have
expected if a partition of fishing opportunities had been necessary at the

56.
David A. Bell, Columbia River Treaty Renewal and Sovereign
Tribal Authority Under the Stevens Treaty “Right-to-Fish” Clause, 36 PUB. LAND &
RESOURCES L. REV. 269, 289 (2015).
57.
Id.
58.
Id. at 290.
59.
Id.
60.
Washington III, 506 F. Supp. at 191.
61.
Id.
62.
Boldt Decision, 384 F. Supp. at 343; United States v. Washington,
520 F.2d 676, 688 (9th Cir. 1975) [hereinafter Washington II].
63.
Boldt Decision, 384 F. Supp. at 344 (emphasis added).
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time of the treaties.”64 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit agreed that Judge
Boldt’s fifty percent allocation not only applied to the tribes’ usual and
accustomed grounds, “but also [to] those [fish] destined for those
grounds but captured downstream or in marine waters.”65
C. A Moderate Living: Washington v. Washington State Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Association
Judge Boldt’s equal sharing allocation came before the Supreme
Court in 1979, in Washington v. Washington State Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Association.66 “Due to continuing and
widespread state defiance after the U.S. v. Washington [sic] rulings,” the
United States intervened on behalf of tribes to yet again determine the
meaning of the right to take fish.67 The central issue before the Supreme
Court was whether Judge Boldt’s determination that tribes were entitled
to fifty percent of all fish taken in traditional fishing grounds was a valid
interpretation of the “in common with” language of the Stevens
Treaties.68
Citing its earlier decision in Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department
of Game of State of Washington, the Supreme Court reiterated that the
right described in the treaties was not “a right to compete with nontreaty
[sic] fishermen on an individual basis,” but rather a “right to a substantial
portion of the run.”69 The Court then reexamined what it meant by “a
substantial portion of the run.”70 Ultimately, the Court found that the
treaty reserved for tribes the right to take enough fish “necessary to
provide the Indians with a livelihood[—]that is to say, a moderate
living.”71 The Court held “the maximum possible allocation to the
Indians is fixed at 50% [sic].”72
64.
Washington II, 520 F.2d at 688.
65.
Id.
66.
Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658.
67.
Bell, supra note 56, at 292.
68.
Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 662.
69.
Id. at 683 (discussing Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dep’t of Game of State
of Wash., 433 U.S. 165 (1977)).
70.
See id. at 683-89.
71.
Id. at 686.
72.
Id. The Court also determined that tribal allocations of the fish
harvests would include fish taken within reservation boundaries. Id. at 687.
Furthermore, the Court also concluded that fish taken for ceremonial and subsistence
needs would be included in the tribes’ allocations. Id. at 688. The Court did,
however, agree that fish taken by non-Indians “from identifiable runs that are
destined for traditional fishing grounds” would count against their allocation. Id.
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III. HABITAT PROTECTION AS AN IMPLIED TREATY RIGHT
A. United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187 (W.D. Wash. 1980)
The Boldt Decision, its subsequent Ninth Circuit affirmation, and
Fishing Vessel represented Phase I of the United States’s litigation
against Washington.73 Phase II commenced with the Western
Washington District Court’s 1980 decision interpreting the Stevens
Treaties to imply a broader right to habitat protection.74 While the Ninth
Circuit eventually reversed the district court, it did recognize the
possibility that some iteration of a habitat protection right might be found
under the correct circumstances.75
The district court recognized five specific environmental
conditions needed for a healthy fish population to survive and the right to
be executed: “‘(1) access to and from the sea, (2) an adequate supply of
good-quality water, (3) a sufficient amount of suitable gravel for
spawning and egg incubation, (4) an ample supply of food, and (5)
sufficient shelter.’”76 The court noted it was “undisputed” that these
conditions were being adversely impacted by human development
degrading the quality of the fisheries habitat.77 If the trend were to
continue, the court concluded, “the right to take fish would eventually be
reduced to the right to dip one’s net into the water . . . and bring it out
empty.”78 Such a result would void a decade of litigation and the explicit
language of the treaties.79

73.
Washington III, 506 F. Supp. at 191.
74.
Id. at 205. While the court’s holding on the issue of hatchery-raised
fish has little bearing on the court’s determination of the habitat issue, the district
court found hatchery-raised fish “are ‘fish’ within the meaning of the treaties’
fishing clause,” and must be included in the fifty percent allocation. Id. at 202.
75.
Washington IV, 694 F.2d at 1389 (“[a]lthough we reject the
environmental servitude created by the district court, we do not hold that the State of
Washington and the Indians have no obligations to respect the other’s rights in the
resource.” Id.).
76.
Washington III, 506 F. Supp. at 203 (quoting WASH. DEP’T OF
FISHERIES, U.S. DEP’T OF FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV. & WASH. DEP’T OF GAME, JOINT
STATEMENT REGARDING THE BIOLOGY, STATUS, MANAGEMENT, AND HARVEST OF
THE SALMON AND STEELHEAD RESOURCES OF THE PUGET SOUND AND OLYMPIC
PENINSULAR DRAINAGES AREAS OF WESTERN WASHINGTON 17 (1973) [hereinafter
JOINT BIOLOGICAL STATEMENT] (on file with the Public Land & Resources Law
Review)).
77.
Id.
78.
Id.
79.
Id. at 203, 205.
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Relying extensively on the court opinions in Phase I, the district
court found “that implicitly incorporated in the treaties’ fishing clause is
the right to have the fishery habitat protected from man-made
despoliation.”80 The court went on to state that “[t]he most fundamental
prerequisite to exercising the right to take fish is the existence of fish to
be taken.”81 The court noted that the “paramount purpose of the treaties”
was to protect the tribes’ right to take fish.82 The court stated, “[i]t is
equally beyond doubt that the existence of an environmentallyacceptable habitat is essential to the survival of the fish, without which
the expressly-reserved right to take fish would be meaningless and
valueless.”83
The district court rooted its holding in precedent, stating that
“[t]he Supreme Court all but resolved the environmental issue” in
Fishing Vessel.84 In Fishing Vessel, the Supreme Court stated that the
treaties did not reserve to tribes “‘merely the chance * * * [sic]
occasionally to dip their nets into the territorial waters,’” but “something
considerably more tangible”: the right to take and harvest fish.85 The
Supreme Court rejected Washington’s argument that the right to take fish
merely conferred upon the tribes the right of “an equal opportunity to try
to catch fish.”86 Extrapolating upon this right, the district court
determined that because the treaties reserved to the tribes the right to take
fish, it necessarily reserved the right to a habitat healthy enough to
support the existence of fish.87
The district court insisted that the implied right to habitat
protection was essentially the same as previously implied rights
recognized by the courts.88 The court pointed to the implied-reservationof-water doctrine89 as consistent with its finding that the Stevens Treaties
80.
Id. at 203.
81.
Id.
82.
Id. at 205.
83.
Id.
84.
Id. at 203.
85.
Id. (quoting Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 679).
86.
Id. (discussing Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 678).
87.
Id. (discussing Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 679).
88.
Id. at 204.
89.
The implied-reservation-of-water doctrine states that when the
federal government sets aside—reserves—public land, it impliedly reserves water
rights as well. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 (1978). The implied
water right exists when “water is necessary to fulfill the very purposes of which a
federal reservation was created.” Id. These water rights may not be implied when it
is merely “valuable for a secondary use of the reservation.” Id. The implied right
reserves only the “amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the
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implied a right to habitat protection.90 The district court found there
could be “no doubt that one of the primary purposes of the treaties . . .
was to reserve the tribes the right to continue fishing as an economic and
cultural way of life.”91 Indeed, the tribes, as parties to the Stevens
Treaties, ceded massive tracts of land to the United States for the express
reservation of certain rights, including the right to fish uninterrupted as
they had before the treaties.92 The court determined that it was “beyond
doubt that the existence of an environmentally-acceptable habitat was
necessary for the survival of the fish.”93 Without such an implied right,
“the expressly-reserved right to take fish would be meaningless and
valueless.”94 The court found that it was “necessary to recognize an
implied environmental right in order to fulfill the purpose of the fishing
clause.”95 Indeed, the court noted that other courts had already found
implied water rights for the purpose of protecting fish. The district court
relied on both Cappaert v. United States96 and United States v.
Anderson,97 which stood for the understanding that the impliedreservation-of-water doctrine could be invoked to ensure “the unimpaired
flow of sufficient quantities of water []as . . . necessary for the protection
of fish.”98
reservation.” Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976). When the implied
water right is necessary for the fulfillment of expressly reserved rights, the right
“arise[s] by implication regardless of the equities that may favor competing water
users.” Washington III, 506 F. Supp. at 205 (citing Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138-39)
(emphasis added). The implied-reservation-of-water doctrine applies not only to
federally set-aside public land, see Cappaert, 426 U.S. 128, but also to the creation
of Indian reservations. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). In Winters
v. Untied States, the seminal case applying the doctrine to Indian reservations, the
Supreme Court determined that the entire purpose of the treaty establishing the Fort
Belknap Indian Reservation was “the civilization and improvement of the Indians.
Id. at 567. Thus, the establishment of the reservation impliedly reserved enough
water to support agriculture on the reservation. Id.
90.
Washington III, 506 F. Supp. at 204.
91.
Id.
92.
See Lewis, supra note 32, at 307.
93.
Washington III, 506 F. Supp. at 205.
94.
Id.
95.
Id.
96.
Cappaert, 426 U.S. 128 (implied-reservation-of-water doctrine
reserved enough groundwater to protect pupfish in Devils Hole, Ash Meadows
National Wildlife Refuge).
97.
United States v. Anderson, 591 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Wash. 1982), aff’d,
732 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984) (the implied-reservation-of-water doctrine reserved
enough water to protect the Spokane Indian Reservation fishery).
98.
Washington III, 506 F. Supp. at 205.
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The district court agreed with the plaintiff tribes and the United
States that, similarly to Cappaert and Anderson, the Stevens Treaties
implied the right that water be of a sufficient quality to support
traditional fisheries.99 Indeed, the court noted that the reservation of
fishing rights was even more crucial to the purpose of the Stevens
Treaties than the implied reservation of water was to the reservations at
issue in Cappaert and Anderson.100 The court held that the right to
habitat protection “must be implied in order to fulfill the purposes of the
fishing clause.”101
In fashioning a remedy, the district court determined that the
implied right to habitat protection did not apply at large, but rather
applied insofar as it protected the rights explicitly reserved by the
tribes.102 Citing Fishing Vessel, the court noted that tribes reserved no
more than fifty percent of the fish taken in usual and accustomed
grounds, or that, which provides the tribes a moderate living.103 The court
found it was that “minimal need which gives rise to an implied right to
environmental protection of fish habitat,” and emphasized that “the scope
of the State’s environmental duty must be ascertained by examining the
treaty-secured fishing right, rather than selecting a desirable standard.”104
The court determined the duty imposed upon the State did not hold it to
the standard of “no significant deterioration,” but rather required the
State keep from degrading the fishery habitat so as not to deprive the
tribes of their moderate living needs, nothing more.105
B. United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982)
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit overturned the district court, finding
that the Stevens Treaties did not imply a broader right to habitat
protection.106 The Ninth Circuit rejected the “underpinnings of the
district court’s opinion,” finding that Fishing Vessel neither guaranteed
an adequate supply nor any particular quantity of fish.107 Going further
still, the Ninth Circuit stated:

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 208.
Id. (citing Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 686-87).
Id.
Id. at 207-08.
Washington IV, 694 F.2d at 1380.
Id.
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[t]o stop there, however, would be to unduly minimize
the treaty obligation and ignore the natural dependence
on one another of all who share the fishery and the
necessity for all to work together to preserve and
enhance its productive capacity. More is required to
resolve adequately the issue of the environmental
right.108
Instead of merely rejecting the premise of the district court’s opinion, the
Ninth Circuit identified “four main objections” it had with the implied
right: “the absence of a basis in precedent, the lack of theoretical or
practical necessity for the right, its unworkably complex standard of
liability, and its potential for disproportionately disrupting essential
economic development.”109
1. The Absence of a Basis in Precedent
The Ninth Circuit stated that while Fishing Vessel held that
tribes were entitled to a certain share of fish, it did not prescribe “in what
manner or under what circumstances this share was entitled to
protection.”110 Where the district court found that Fishing Vessel held
that tribes reserved the right to take enough fish to support a moderate
living, the Ninth Circuit found that Fishing Vessel only held that tribes
reserved the right to fish for enough fish to support a moderate living.111
The Ninth Circuit determined that the treaties reserved only the right to
take “a share of the available fish, rather than . . . a fixed quantity.”112
Such a right, the court found, did not impute any duty upon the State to
maintain the fisheries at any level.113 While the court recognized that the
existence of fish was fundamental to the ability of tribes to exercise their
treaty right, the court stated that this truth “does not establish that the
Tribes possess an environmental right” requiring the fisheries to be
maintained at the current, historic, or even “economically satisfactory
levels.”114

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
removed).
113.
114.

Id.
Id. at 1381.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1382 (citing Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 685-87) (emphasis
Id. at 1381.
Id.
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While the Ninth Circuit recognized “that there must be fish to
give value to the right to take fish,” it substantially qualified this
statement by asserting that a “right may be subject to contingencies
which would render it valueless.”115 The court stated that an event that
strips away the practical value of exercising a right “does not impair the
right itself, but merely eliminates the gain its holder hoped to realize.”116
The Ninth Circuit recognized, however, that state regulation could not
discriminate against native fisheries.117 “A pattern of development which
concentrated the adverse effect of growth on treaty fish runs and spared
non-treaty runs” could violate the treaty.118 The court determined that no
environmental right was needed to remedy such violations, as such
actions would by themselves clearly violate the treaty.119
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the district court’s reliance on the
implied-reservation-of-water doctrine.120 In theory, the Ninth Circuit
recognized that the implied-reservation-of-water doctrine could be used
to enforce some level of habitat protection in traditional fishing
grounds.121 The court concluded that in certain instances, the right could
be used “for the development and maintenance of replacement fishing
grounds,” but only when “access to fishing grounds was one purpose for
the creation of the reservation.”122 The court found the doctrine
inapplicable to the case before it, however, as it determined that the
reservation of fishing rights was not the main purpose for the creation of
tribes’ reservations under the Stevens Treaties.123 Instead, the court
viewed it as “an independent grant not dependent on the existence of a
reservation.”124 The court noted that the implied-reservation-of-water

115. Id.
116. Id. (emphasis in original).
117. Id. at 1382 (citing Dep’t of Game of Wash. v. Puyallup Tribe, 414
U.S. 44, 48 (1973)).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1383-84.
121. Id. at 1383 (citing Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d
42, 48 (9th Cir. 1981)).
122. Id. (citing Walton, 647 F.2d at 48).
123. Id. at 1383-84.
124. Id.; see contra United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (9th Cir.
1983).
In view of the historical importance of hunting and fishing, and
the language of Article I of the 1864 Treaty, we find that one of
the “very purposes” of establishing the Klamath Reservation was
to secure to the Tribe a continuation of its traditional hunting and
fishing lifestyle. This was at the forefront of the Tribe’s concerns
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doctrine generally applied to the quantity of water in traditional fishing
grounds, not the quality.125 The implied-reservation-of-water doctrine,
the court noted, was not necessary to guarantee tribes the right to “a fair
share” of fish.126
2. Lack of Necessity
The Ninth Circuit also found that there was no “theoretical or
practical need for an environmental right” because the State did not have
an interest in allowing the fisheries to decline.127 The court rejected the
argument that the State would destroy the fisheries “unless prevented by
an environmental right.”128 The court pointed out that the State licensed
6,000 non-Indian commercial and 280,000 non-Indian recreational and

in negotiating the treaty and was recognized as important by the
United States as well.
Id. at 1409. Article I of the treaty states, “and the exclusive right of taking fish in
streams and lakes, including in said reservation, and of gathering edible roots,
seeds, and berries within its limits, is hereby secured to the Indians aforesaid.”
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Klamath and Moadoc Tribes
and Yahooskin Band of Snake Indians art. I, July 2, 1866, 16 Stat. 707 [hereinafter
Treaty with the Klamaths] (emphasis added). Similar language is found in four of
Governor Steven’s treaties, including one of the Stevens Treaties: Treaty with the
Yakimas, supra note 25, at art. III; Treaty of Hellgate, supra note 25, at art. III;
Walla Walla Treaty, supra note 25, at art. I; Nez Perce Treaty of 1855, supra note
25, at art. III.
125. Washington IV, 694 F.2d. at 1384; see contra United States v. Gila
Valley Irrigation Dist., 920 F. Supp. 1444, 1454 (D. Ariz. 1996), aff’d, 117 F.3d 425
(9th Cir. 1997) (the implied-reservation-of-water doctrine reserved the San Carlos
Apache Tribe a sufficient quality of water to support agriculture).
126. Washington IV, 694 F.2d at 1384; see contra cf. Parravano v.
Babbitt, 861 F. Supp. 914 (N.D. Cal. 1994), aff’d, 70 F.3d 539 (9th Cir. 1995) (as a
matter of fist impression, the district court determined that “off-reservation
regulation of fisher[ies] pursuant to non-treaty based tribal fishing rights” was
permissible to the same extent as treaty-based fishing rights. Id. at 924. The court
noted that “for the Tribes’ federally reserved fishing right to have any practical
meaning, it must include regulation of activities occurring outside the reservation
which negatively impact that right.” Id. The court concluded that the fact “[t]hat the
fishing rights . . . arose through treaty rather than through statutory and executive
authority does not affect the scope of the fishing right.” Id. The court cited the
implied-reservation-of-water doctrine in determining that non-treaty-based federally
reserved fishing rights could be protected through off-reservation regulation. Id.
(discussing Winters, 207 U.S. at 576; Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 599
(1963); Walton, 647 F.2d at 47)).
127. Washington IV, 694 F.2d. at 1384-85.
128. Id. at 1384.
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sport fishermen.129 The court determined that the interests of non-Native
and Native fishermen were “inextricably linked,” and that tribes should
not be concerned about the depletion of their traditional fisheries, as such
a depletion would adversely affect the State’s interests as well.130
The court also pointed out that since 1960, Coho and Chinook
salmon harvests had “increased dramatically.”131 Indeed, the court noted
that the harvest of all salmon species in Washington, “while subject to
fluctuation, has continued in comparative abundance from 1935 to
1970.”132 The court also found the production of hatchery-raised fish
would help “substantial[ly]” mitigate any reduction in the natural
fisheries.133 The court found that the State, tribes, and the United States
had “strong interest[s] in preserving and enhancing the fisheries.”134 The
Ninth Circuit surmised that there could be no “theoretical or practical
necessity” for tribes’ independent right to habitat protection since the
State was interested in preserving the fisheries, and there appeared to be
no decline in fishery production.135
3. Unworkably Complex Standard of Liability
The Ninth Circuit further found that the implied right to habitat
protection created a standard of liability that was “unworkably
complex.”136 The district court created a duty that “require[d] the State to
refrain from degrading the fish habitat to an extent that would deprive the
Tribes of their moderate living needs.”137 The district court determined
that to establish a violation of the implied right, “Tribes must shoulder
the initial burden of proving that a challenged action will proximately
cause the fish habitat to be degraded such that the future or current [fish]
129. Id. at 1385.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1386.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1384.
136. Id. at 1387.
137. Id. (discussing Washington III, 506 F. Supp. at 208). The Ninth
Circuit stated that the district court’s holding implied the tribes were allocated fifty
percent of the take, that their needs could increase that percentage, and that they
were entitled to historic fish levels. Id. at 1387-88. However, the district court
correctly interpreted Fishing Vessel as capping tribes’ allocation at fifty percent, a
level which could only be reduced, and did not find that the right to habitat
protection required the restoration of historic fish levels. Washington III, 506 F.
Supp. at 208 (citing Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 686-87).
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runs will be diminished.”138 Once the tribe has made its showing, the
burden would shift to the State to prove “that any degradation of the fish
habitat proximately caused by the State’s actions . . . will not impair the
Tribes’ ability to satisfy their moderate living needs.”139
The Ninth Circuit was concerned, however, with “the difficult
issue of causation,” created in the district court’s burden-shifting
standard of liability.140 The court found “[t]he remoteness in the causal
chain between a potentially impairing project and the reduced fish
harvest” was far too complex and cumbersome for both trial courts and
litigants to ascertain.141 The Ninth Circuit also noted the difficult position
the State would be placed in by having to show what harvests would
satisfy the tribes’ moderate living needs and how a reduction would not
violate tribes’ moderate living needs.142 The court opined that the
standard of liability established by the district court would require state
permit issuing agencies to review the impacts actions would have on the
traditional fisheries.143 The Ninth Circuit found that the Stevens Treaties
did not “impose on the State the burden of . . . assur[ing] [the tribes’]
‘moderate living needs.’”144
4. Disproportionately Disruptive Effect
The Ninth Circuit finally cautioned that the implied right would
create a “servitude [that] affects all State or State-authorized activities
affecting the environment, not just those involving appropriative
consumption of water.”145 The court was concerned that the right could
extend far beyond the purpose of the Stevens Treaties.146 The Treaties,
the court noted, were meant “to settle any and all Indian claims to land
title . . . so that non-Indian settlers could develop their lands without
conflict with the Indians.”147 The court also found that if the right
required state permits “to place the highest priority on avoiding any
potential impacts upon fisheries,” the right would frustrate the State’s
“competing . . . interest in allowing various types of development in
138.
Supp. at 208).
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Washington IV, 694 F.2d at 1388 (discussing Washington III, 506 F.
Id. (citing Washington III, 506 F. Supp. at 208).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1388-89 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 1389.
Id.
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different locations.”148 To avoid the undercutting of economic
development and disputes between Indians and non-Indians, the court
noted that the “right must be tempered by a reasonableness
requirement.”149
While the Ninth Circuit rejected the understanding that the
Stevens Treaties implied a right to habitat protection, the court did not go
so far as to hold that the State and the tribes “have no obligations to
respect the other’s rights in the resource.”150 Indeed, the court noted that
the State and tribes must act “reasonably” in taking “compensatory steps
to protect and enhance the fisheries.”151 In the court’s view, these
obligations did not arise, however, from an implied right within the
treaties.
C. United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1985) (en
banc)
In an en banc rehearing, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the panel’s
reversal of the “environmental issue.”152 However, the en banc panel
vacated the opinion of the three-judge panel and declared that its opinion
would be the court’s final decision.153 The holding of the full panel,
however, is squarely rooted in the reasoning of the three-judge panel’s
decision. The full panel stated that the district court could not announce
new legal rules “when the subject parties and the court giving judgment
are left to guess at their meaning.”154 The en banc panel stated, “[i]t
serves neither the needs of the parties, . . . nor the interests of the public
for the judiciary to employ declaratory judgment procedure to announce
legal rules imprecise in definition and uncertain in dimension.”155 The
court left open the possibility that under the right circumstances an
environmental-based right might be found to exist, stating, “the State’s
precise obligations and duties under the treaty with respect to the myriad
State actions that may affect the environment . . . will depend . . . upon
concrete facts which underlie a dispute in a particular case.”156 The court,
148. Id. at 1388.
149. Id. at 1389. The court did not state what the “reasonableness
requirement” would look like, except that it was one “we have recognized.” Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.; see cf. Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 684-85.
152. United States v. Washington, 759 F.2d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir. 1985)
(en banc) [hereinafter Washington V].
153. Id. at 1354.
154. Id. at 1357.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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however, rejected the idea that the right to take fish imposed an
affirmative environmental duty on the State. Instead, such a right would
merely be reflexive, and could only be exercised in response to specific
State actions that degraded traditional fisheries.157
IV. REESTABLISHING THE IMPLIED RIGHT TO HABITAT
PROTECTION
In reestablishing the implied right to habitat protection, the
treaty-reserved right to take fish can be used as a broadly applicable, yet
precise, proactive tool for preventative ecological preservation, rather
than merely a reflexive tool meant for ecological restoration. The
enforcement of the reestablished implied right must be asserted with
respect to particular projects and their particular environmental
consequences. Enforcement of the implied right could be incorporated
into environmental reviews under the National Environmental Policy Act
(“NEPA”)158 and the Washington State Environmental Policy Act
(“SEPA”),159 or by challenging specific actions under the Administrative
Procedures Act160 and the Washington State Administrative Procedures
Act.161 To succeed in reestablishing the implied right, the Nation—or any
tribe—must overcome each one of the Ninth Circuit’s “four main
objections.”162 First, the Nation must establish that the interpretation of
the Treaty of Point Elliot implies a broader right to habitat protection is
based in precedent. Second, the Nation must establish its practical and
theoretical need for the implied right. Third, the Nation must show that
while the standard of liability may be complex, it is nonetheless
workable. Finally, the Nation must show that the effects of the implied
right are not disproportionately disruptive to the economy and to the
State.
A. Presence of a Basis in Precedent
The first hurdle in reestablishing the implied right is overcoming
the Ninth Circuit’s assertions that the implied right lacks a basis in
157. Id.
158. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83
Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2012)).
159. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 43.21c.010-43.21c.914 (2009).
160. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237
(1946) (codified as 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3106, 3344, 4301, 5335,
5372, 7521 (2012)).
161. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 34.05.010-34.05.903 (2015).
162. See Washington IV, 694 F.2d at 1381.
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precedent,163 and that it is “imprecise in definition and uncertain in
dimension.”164 Notably, the Ninth Circuit did recognize the logic of the
district court’s statement that the right to take fish required fish to
exist.165 Since the Ninth Circuit’s three-judge panel and en banc
decisions, a series of lower court decisions have established a line of
precedent that is the foundation for the reestablishment of the implied
right to habitat protection.166 The lower court decisions have both
“affirmed an implicit right to habitat protection,” as well as “indirectly
acknowledged the right . . . with injunctive relief.”167 While the cases do
not explicitly establish the implied right, the “opinions are logically
consistent with” the understanding that the right exists.168
Even before the United States v. Washington litigation, it had
been “well established that the United States could be held liable for
monetary damages if reserved Indian fisheries were harmed by . . .
environmental degradation.”169 For example, in 1973, the United States
District Court for the District of Oregon, in Confederated Tribes of the
Umatilla Indian Reservation v. Callaway,170 issued what scholars believe
to be the first opinion “recogni[zing] that the treaties could be used to
protect salmon habitat.”171 The district court ordered the United States
Army Corps of Engineers (“Army Corps”) and the Bonneville Power
Administration to operate the Columbia River Power System in a manner
that would not “‘impair or destroy any fishing rights . . . secured by
Treaty with the Indians.’”172 In a continuation of the reasoning of
Calloway, the district court, in Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla
Reservation v. Alexander, issued a declaratory judgement stating that the
constructing of a dam on Catherine Creek would “impair access to . . .

163. Id.
164. Washington V, 759 F.2d at 1357.
165. Washington IV, 694 F.2d at 1381.
166. See infra notes 170-203, and accompanying text.
167. Ruth Langride, The Right to Habitat Protection, 29 PUB. LAND &
RESOURCES L. REV. 41, 44-45 (2008).
168. Lewis, supra note 32, at 299.
169. Allen H. Sanders, Damaging Indian Treaty Fisheries: A Violation of
Tribal Property Rights?, 17 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 153, 173 n.116
(1996).
170. Confederated Tribes of Umatilla Reservation v. Calloway, Civ. No.
72-211 (D. Or. Aug. 17, 1973).
171. Michael C. Blumm & Brett M. Swift, The Indian Piscary Profit and
Habitat Protection in the Pacific Northwest: A Property Rights Approach, 69 U.
COLO. L. REV. 407, 464 (1998) (discussing Calloway, Civ. No. 72-211).
172. Id. (quoting Calloway, Civ. No. 72-211, slip op. at 7); see also
Sanders, supra note 170, at 173 n.116.
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traditional [fishing] stations” by covering them in 200 feet of water, and
“prevent all wild fish from swimming upstream.”173 Importantly, the
court concluded, “the treaty right to fish at all the usual and accustomed
stations will be destroyed.”174 The court determined that had Congress
“expressly and specifically” nullified the treaty rights to allow the
construction of the dam and allow for such an increase in water levels,
the Army Corps would not have violated the treaty rights of the Umatilla
when it flooded their traditional fisheries.175
In a series of decisions in Kittitas Reclamation District v.
Sunnyside Valley Irrigation District, the Ninth Circuit ultimately upheld
the district court’s determination requiring the Watermaster at the Cle
Elum Dam in Washington to take steps to ensure adequate water levels
over salmon spawning grounds.176 Initially, the Ninth Circuit found that
the parties to the Yakima Nation’s treaty “‘bear a duty to refrain from
actions interfering with either the Indians’ access to fishing grounds or
the amount of fish present there.’”177 While the final en banc opinion
found it unnecessary to “decide the scope of fishing rights reserved to the
Yakima Nation,” the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s order
protecting the spawning habitat.178
In 1988 the Western Washington District Court, in Muckleshoot
Indian Tribe v. Hass, enjoined a project that proposed to build a small
craft marina in Elliot Bay.179 The proposed marina was to be located
within one of the traditional fishing grounds of the Muckleshoot Indian
Tribe and the Squamish Nation.180 The district court enjoined the
construction of the marina, finding that the “elimination of a portion of
the usual and accustomed fishing ground . . . [would] deny the Tribes
access to their usual and accustomed fishing ground, and the loss to the
Tribe [would] be substantial.”181 The court rejected the Army Corps’s
argument that only a portion of the traditional fishery would be impacted,
173. Confederated Tribes of Umatilla Reservation v. Alexander, 440 F.
Supp. 553, 555-56 (D. Or. 1977).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Kittitas Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., 763
F.2d 1032, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 1985).
177. Blumm & Swift, supra note 172, at 465-66 n.282 (quoting Kittitas
Reclamation Dist. v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist., No. 80-3505, slip op. at 5
(9th Cir. Sept. 10, 1982)).
178. Kittitas Reclamation Dist., 763 F.2d at 1034-35 n.5.
179. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. Hass, 698 F. Supp. 1504 (W.D. Wash.
1988).
180. Id. at 1510.
181. Id. at 1515-16.
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thus allowing the tribes to still access enough of the fishery to satisfy
their moderate living needs.182 The elimination of even a portion of the
tribes’ usual and accustomed fishing grounds, the court concluded,
would constitute a “substantial” loss.183
In 1996, the Western Washington District Court upheld the
Army Corps’s denial of a permit to construct a fish farm in the waters of
Rosario Straight, next to Lummi Island, as it “would interfere with the
treaty fishing rights of the Lummi Nation.”184 In upholding the Army
Corps’s denial of the permit, the court, in Northwest Sea Farmers v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers, held that the federal government
“owe[d] a fiduciary duty to ensure that the Lummi Nation’s treaty rights
are not abrogated or impinged.”185 The court found there was no need to
show that the fish farm would impact the number of fish available for
harvest.186 Instead, noting the “‘geographical’ component” of the Treaty
of Point Elliot, the court found that the “entire area” where fishing was
contemplated by the treaty “would be obstructed to tribal members.”187
By finding that the obstructions caused by the fish farm would so
substantially affect the traditional fishery, the court “effectively
preserved productive fish habitat” for the Nation.188
Most significant is the Western Washington District Court’s
2007 decision in United States v. Washington, known as the Culverts
Case.189 The issue before the court was “whether the Tribes’ treaty-based
182. Id. Citing the British Columbia Supreme Court, the district court
noted that the treaties “protected the Indians’ right to the whole fishery, not just
some part.” Id. (citing Saanichton Marina Ltd. v. Claxton (1987), 43 D.L.R. (4th)
481, at para 13 (B.C.S.C.), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, (1989) 57 D.L.R. (4th) 161
(B.C.C.A.)) (emphasis added).
183. Id. at 1515-16.
184. Nw. Sea Farmers v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 931 F. Supp. 1515,
1522 (W.D. Wash. 1996).
185. Id. at 1520. In litigation over an irrigation project connected to the
Klamath River, the Ninth Circuit noted that water management in the Klamath River
Basin was “especially difficult” because “[s]everal tribes in the area ha[d] treaty
rights to Klamath River fish.” Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation, 426 F.3d 1082, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 2005). Much like the
district court in Northwest Sea Farmers, the Ninth Circuit iterated that the federal
government owed a “fiduciary duty to maintain these resources.” Id. at 1086
(emphasis added).
186. Nw. Sea Farmers, 931 F. Supp. at 1522
187. Id. at 1521-22.
188. Lewis, supra note 32, at 299.
189. United States v. Washington, 20 F. Supp. 3d 828 (W.D. Wash.
2007) [hereinafter Culverts Case]; see also United States v. Washington, 20 F. Supp.
3d 986 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (enforcing the decision in the Culverts Case in response
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right of taking fish imposed upon the State a duty to refrain from
diminishing fish runs by constructing or maintaining culverts that block
fish passage.”190 In finding that the State did owe such a duty, the district
court conducted an exhaustive analysis of the United States v.
Washington decisions on the implied right to habitat protection.191 The
district court concluded that the Ninth Circuit’s en banc opinion could
not “be read as rejecting the concept of a treaty-based duty to avoid
specific actions which impair salmon runs.”192 The court noted that in
Phase II, the Ninth Circuit “clearly presume[d] some obligation on the
part of the State” to maintain fish habitats.193 Similar to the district
court’s analysis in 1980, which found the existence of the implied right,
the district court in the Culverts Case determined that at the time the
treaties were signed, “[i]t was . . . the government’s intent, and the
Tribes’ understanding, that they would be able to meet their own
subsistence needs forever.”194 The court held that the treaties did impose
a duty on the State not to construct or maintain culverts that blocked fish
from passing up or down stream.195 The district court specifically
curtailed the scope of its decision, noting that it was “not a broad
‘environmental servitude’ . . . , but rather a narrow directive.”196 In
reference to the en banc opinion in Phase II, the district court reiterated
that the “Tribes . . . presented sufficient facts . . . to justify a declaratory
judgement.”197
to the State’s slow response to remedy barrier culverts: “[a]n injunction is necessary
to ensure that the State will act expeditiously in correcting the barrier culvers which
violate the Treaty promises.” Id. at 1022). The appeal of the district court’s
permanent injunction requiring the State to remove or fix culverts blocking fish
passage is currently pending before the Ninth Circuit. Oral arguments were held on
October 16, 2015. See infra note 225. Within the series of litigation concerning the
Culverts Case, the district court emphasized that “[t]he State’s duty to maintain,
repair or replace culverts . . . does not arise from a broad environmental servitude.”
United States v. Washington, No. CV 70-9213, 2013 WL 1334391, at *24 (W.D.
Wash. Mar. 29, 2013).
190. Culverts Case, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 892.
191. Id. at 893-95.
192. Id. at 894 (discussing Washington IV, 759 F.2d at 1357).
193. Id. at 893-94 (discussing Washington IV, 759 F.2d at 1357).
194. Id. at 897 (discussing Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658).
195. Id. at 899.
196. Id. Importantly, the district court did not cite a single case outside
the Phase I progeny. The court tailored its opinion as narrowly as it could to avoid
the ultimate conclusion this paper attempts to make: that there is sufficient precedent
to find support for a generally applicable right to habitat protection that indeed
places an “environmental servitude” on traditional fisheries.
197. Id.
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While the court’s determination in the Culverts Case does not
impose an affirmative duty on the state to avoid specific actions that
would degrade specific tribal fisheries, it does provide tribes with a tool
to challenge those actions that degrade the fisheries.198 The Culverts
Case imposes a duty on the State to remedy actions that are specifically
shown to degrade tribal fisheries.199 While this decision falls short of the
broad environmental duty envisioned by the district court in Phase II of
United States v. Washington, it nonetheless lays the foundation upon
which the broader implied right can be reestablished. Indeed, the court
repeatedly referenced the State’s obligations not to degrade the fisheries.
If the State bears a duty to remedy actions that degrade specific fishery
habitats when tribes can show that such actions harmed the fisheries, its
duty logically extends to avoid harming the traditional fishers in the first
place by taking steps to protect them. A proactive duty to avoid harm and
protect traditional fisheries is exactly the scope of the implied right the
district court in Phase II understood the Stevens Treaties to impose.
The line of cases outlining the scope of fishing rights, read
together with the most recent iteration of United States v. Washington,
lays a sufficient basis for courts to find that the right to take fish implies
a right to habitat protection, which imposes an environmental duty on the
State to refrain from degrading the fisheries. Indeed, the dissent to the en
banc opinion rejecting the implied right found that such a right certainly
existed.
I agree with the district court that the Tribes have an
implicit treaty right to a sufficient quantity of fish to
provide them with a moderate living, and the related
right not to have the fishery habitat degraded to the
extent that the minimum standard cannot be met. I also
agree that the State has a correlative duty to refrain from
degrading or authorizing others to degrade the fish
habitat in such a manner.200
United States Circuit Judge Dorothy Wright Nelson, in her dissent, stated
that imposing a duty on the State to refrain from degrading fishery
“‘habitat to the extent that would deprive the Tribes of their moderate

198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Washington V, 759 F.2d at 1367 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added). Indeed, the district court in the Culverts Case relied heavily on Judge
Nelson’s dissent in crafting its opinion. See 20 F. Supp. 3d at 894 n.5.
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living needs’ by no means represents an extraordinary limitation of State
authority.”201
Since the Ninth Circuit’s Phase II decisions in United States v.
Washington, lower courts have laid the necessary foundation to take the
logical step from defining the right to actually harvest fish under Fishing
Vessel, to understanding that the treaties preserve the right to actually
harvest fish by impliedly reserving the right to habitat protection.202 The
Ninth Circuit’s worry that the right lacks an “absence of basis in
precedent” is clearly alleviated.

201. Washington V, 759 F.2d at 1366 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (quoting
Washington III, 506 F. Supp. at 208).
202. See also No Oilport! v. Carter, 520 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. Wash. 1981)
(an issue of fact existed “as to whether sedimentation caused by burying the pipeline
across rivers will adversely affect spawning beds such that the rearing or production
potential of the fish will be impaired or the size or quality of the run will be
diminished.” Id. at 372. Summary judgment was denied and the tribes were “allowed
the opportunity to attempt to satisfy their burden” of showing the pipeline would
degrade the fishery. Id.); Walton, 647 P.2d 42 (the implied-reservation-of-water
doctrine reserved to the tribe the “right to the quantity of water necessary to maintain
the Omak Lake Fishery . . . and to permit natural spawning of the trout.” Id. at 48);
Adair, 723 F.2d 1394 (the court determined that the treaty-reserved right to hunt and
fish was “one of the ‘very purposes’ of establishing the Klamath Reservation [and]
to secure to the Tribe a continuation of its traditional hunting and fishing lifestyle.”
Id. at 1409. Citing “the ‘moderate living’ standard enunciated in Fishing Vessel,” the
Ninth Circuit “affirm[ed] . . . that the Klamath Tribe [was] entitled to a reservation
of water . . . sufficient to support [the] exercise of treaty hunting and fishing rights.
Id. at 1415 (citing Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 686)); Anderson, 591 F. Supp. 1 (the
treaty establishing the reservation “insure[d] the Spokane Indians access to fishing
areas and to fish for food,” such that the court required sufficient in-stream flows to
maintain an adequate level of water flow and temperature. Id. at 7-10); see contra
Ground Zero Ctr. for Nonviolent Action v. Dep’t of the U.S. Navy, 918 F. Supp. 2d
1132 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (the court held that the Navy’s construction of a wharf did
not infringe upon the Suquamish Tribe’s treaty rights. Id. at 1151-52. The Tribe
argued that the proposed wharf “would reduce fish and shellfish populations and
impair the Tribe’s ability to exercise its treaty rights north of the Hood Canal
Bridge,” and would impact its ability to access its tradition fisheries. Id. at 1152.
(internal quotation omitted). The court concluded that it “ha[d] difficulty finding
evidence that the Tribe’s fishing will be impacted,” and emphasized that the tribe
had “fail[ed] to present any argument suggesting that the Navy’s mitigation
measures w[ould] be ineffective.” Id. While the case focused on access, rather than
habitat degradation, the court noted the extensive studies the Navy conducted on the
wharf’s impact and the mitigation measures it planned on implementing. Id. at 115154).
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B. Necessity of the Right
The Ninth Circuit rejected the notion that either a theoretical or
practical need for the right to habitat protection existed.203 In doing so,
the court pointed to relatively strong fishery levels in Washington, as
well as the State’s and the tribes’ seemingly co-extensive interest in
protecting the fisheries.204 According to the Washington State Recreation
and Conservation Office (“WSRCO”), however, wild salmon have
disappeared from forty percent of their historic breeding grounds
throughout the Pacific Northwest since 1999.205 The United States Fish
& Wildlife Service currently lists sixteen distinct Pacific Northwest
salmonid runs as endangered or threatened under the Endangered Species
Act (“ESA”).206 Throughout Washington, salmonids are listed as either
threatened or endangered in nearly three-quarters of the State.207
According to numbers recorded by the National Marine Fisheries
Service, in 1982, when the Ninth Circuit first found no practical or
theoretical need for the right, commercial fishermen in Washington
harvested 23,144.6 metric tons of salmon.208 In 2014, by contrast, only
12,588.7 metric tons of salmon were harvested from Washington
fisheries.209 Chum harvests dropped 4.7 percent; Coho, 60.4 percent; and
203. Washington IV, 694 F.2d at 1384.
204. Id. at 1385 (citing JOINT BIOLOGICAL STATEMENT, supra note 77, at
13-16). The Ninth Circuit identified Chinook, Chum, Pink, Coho, and Sockeye
salmon in its opinion. Id. The Washington State Department of Fish & Wildlife
identifies eight native “salmonids” in coastal waters, including Steelhead, Bull, and
Coastal Cutthroat trout. See Wash. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, Salmon/Steelhead
Species Information, STATE OF WASH., http://wdfw.wa.gov/fishing/salmon/species.
html (last visited Apr. 5, 2015).
205. Wash. State Recreation and Conservation Office, Salmon Recovery
in Washington, STATE OF WASH., http://www.rco.wa.gov/%5C/salmon_recovery/
index.shtml (last visited Apr. 5, 2015).
206. Wash. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, Washington State Species of
Concern Lists, STATE OF WASH., http://wdfw.wa.gov/conservation/endangered/list/
Fish (last visited Apr. 5, 2015); see Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (codified as 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2012)).
207. Wash. State Recreation and Conservation Office, supra note 206.
208. See Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Annual Commercial Landings
Statistics, NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., OFFICE OF SCI. AND TECH.,
http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/commercial-fisheries/commercial-landings/annual-land
ings (last visited Jan. 18, 2016) (under “SPECIES,” enter “salmon”; under “YEAR
RANGE,” select “1982” under “FROM”; under “GEOGRAPHICAL AREA
STATE/AREA,” select “Washington”; under “OUTPUT FORM,” select “TABLE”;
finally, select “Submit Query”).
209. See id.
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Sockeye, 77.5 percent.210 The Pacific salmon harvest, which was 686.2
metric tons in 1982, was all but eliminated by 2006.211 The Puget Sound
Partnership (“PSP”), the Washington agency charged with restoring the
Puget Sound watershed, notes that of the thirty-seven historic Chinook
runs in Washington, only twenty-two remain.212 The remaining Chinook
runs, the PSP cautions, are only at ten percent of their historic level, with
some even lower than one percent.213
Of the leading factors the WSRCO has identified as contributing
to the decline in state fisheries, most affect habitat: “[l]oss,
fragmentation, and destruction of salmon habitat”; “[l]and uses that
pollute waterways and degrade habitat”; “[d]ams”; “[f]luctuating marine
conditions”; and “[c]limate change.”214 In an exposé by PBS Newshour
in 2012, legendary Native American civil and fishing rights activist Billy
Frank, Jr., warned that melting glaciers, attributable to climate change,
would adversely impact Native fisheries.215 Salmon depend on cold,
glacier-fed mountain streams for spawning grounds and habitat for
juvenile salmon.216 Since 1920, the average temperature of streams in the
North Cascades has risen 1.5 degrees Fahrenheit, and, by 2080, the
average water temperature of these streams is predicted to rise above
seventy degrees Fahrenheit—a temperature lethal to both juvenile
salmon and salmon eggs.217 Indeed, the Environmental Protection
Agency has warned that between 2050 and 2100, up to at least fifty
percent of stream habitat for trout and salmon will be destroyed by
climate change.218 While the impacts of climate change are likely to
affect all fisheries, coastal tribes would be disproportionately affected as

210. See id. In 2014 the commercial harvest of Chinook had risen by 3.9
percent, while the harvest of Pink had risen 433 percent. See id. Eighty pounds of
Pacific salmon was harvested. See id.
211. See id.
212. Puget Sound P’ship, Salmon Recovery in Puget Sound, STATE OF
WASH., http://www.psp.wa.gov/salmon-recovery-status.php (last visited Apr. 7,
2015).
213. Id.
214. Wash. State Recreation and Conservation Office, supra note 206.
The WSRCO also identified over fishing, competition from hatchery-raised fish, and
increased predation as contributing factors. Id.
215. Campbell & de Melker, supra note 10.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING AND EVALUATION, supra note 8, at 247, Exhibit 2-27.
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substantial parts of their economic, cultural, and religious identities rely
on fishing.219
In 1982, the Ninth Circuit could not envision a practical, or even
theoretical, necessity for the right, as the State’s interests in preserving
fishery habitats, in the eyes of the court, were “identical” to those of the
tribes.220 Tribes’ interests in preserving their traditional fisheries,
however, are not co-extensive with the State’s interests in preserving its
fisheries. The treaties reserved for tribes’ specific traditional fisheries,
which are distinct from those of the State. Tribes’ interests and goals in,
and methods of, protecting their traditional fisheries are not the same as
those of the State. Fishing is a way of life; it is a cultural and spiritual
exercise, and it is a way to sustain life.221
State policies to preserve the habitat of its fisheries do not
necessarily incorporate plans to preserve specific traditional fisheries,
nor do they always aim to achieve the same goals. While State fisheries
are all located within the waters of the State, tribes must prove that
certain, specific fisheries are in “‘location[s] where members of a tribe
customarily fish[] from time to time.’”222 In determining these usual and
accustomed grounds, vis-à-vis the enforcement of treaty rights, courts
must make an extensive factual determination that “tribal . . . fishing
takes place in the . . . area.”223 Because the tribes have particularized
interests in preserving the habitat of specific fisheries, their interests in
and actions to preserve these fisheries and habitats are not co-extensive
with the broader, more generally applicable State interests and actions.
The State manages fisheries throughout State waters, and looks to
broadly applicable management. The tribes, however, manages specific
and discrete fisheries, where large-scale management does not apply.
The impacts climate change, over-fishing, and development
within Washington watersheds have had on the populations of salmon
and the productivity of fisheries clearly establish a practical need for the
implied right. Additionally, the implied right to habitat protection is
necessarily simply because the right to take fish exists. The different
goals, purpose, and implementation of preservation and restoration
policies, as well as the distinction in specific fisheries and habitats that
need protection emphasize the divergent interests between State and
219. See NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, supra note 3, at 20; Fears, supra note
3; Campbell & de Melker, supra note 10.
220. Washington IV, 694 F.2d at 1385.
221. See generally WILKINSON, supra note 4, at 100.
222. Nw. Sea Farmers, 931 F. Supp. at 1521 (quoting Boldt Decision,
384 F. Supp. at 332).
223. Id.
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tribal action, and reinforce the understanding that there exists a
theoretical need for the right.224 The enforcement of tribes’ rights to
protect their traditional fisheries and habitats cannot be contingent on the
State satisfying its separate, albeit similar, interests.225
C. Workable Standard of Liability
The Ninth Circuit also found that the steps outlined by the
district court setting forth the standard of liability and burden of proof
required by tribes to enforce the implied right to habitat protection was
“unworkably complex.”226 The Ninth Circuit worried that “[t]he
remoteness in the causal chain between a potentially impairing project
and a reduced fish harvest is . . . inevitable,” and that pinpointing the
effects of a specific project that was impairing the fishery would be
“difficult.”227 The court also rejected the district court’s burden shifting
standard for establishing and disproving a claim made under the right.228
As a solid line of cases have since shown, however, district courts have
been well equipped to pinpoint the causal connection between a specific

224. E.g., during oral arguments before the Ninth Circuit in the State’s
appeal of a permanent injunction issued pursuant to the Culverts Case, the State all
but conceded that its interpretation of the treaties would allow the State to fully
destroy the fisheries by blocking upstream passage through the construction dams or
other barriers. USA, et al v. State of Washington, No. 13-35474, at 17:39 to 18:46
(U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the Ninth Cir. oral argument Oct. 16, 2015), available at
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid=0000008307.
225. See generally NW. INDIAN FISHERIES COMM’N, UNDERSTANDING
TRIBAL TREATY RIGHTS IN WESTERN WASHINGTON, available at http://nwifc.org/
w/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2014/10/understanding-treaty-rights-final.pdf (last
visited Jan. 13, 2016).
“We, the Indians of the Pacific Northwest, recognize that our
fisheries are a basic and important natural resource and of vital
concern to the Indians of this state, and that the conservation of
the natural resource is defendant upon effective and progressive
management. We further belief that by unity of action, we can
best accomplish these things, not only for the benefit of our own
people, but for all of the people of the Pacific Northwest.”
NW. INDIAN FISHERIES COMM’N CONST. pmbl., in NW. INDIAN FISHERIES COMM’N,
TRIBAL NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT: A REPORT FROM THE TREATY INDIAN
TRIBES IN WESTERN WASHINGTON 2 (2015), available at http://nwifc.org/w/wpcontent/uploads/downloads/2015/01/NWIFC-Annual-Report-2015.pdf.
226. Washington IV, 694 F.2d at 1387.
227. Id. at 1388.
228. Id.
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project and potential or actual degradation of fisheries.229 The outline
presented by the district court, establishing the required showings and
shifting burdens of parties, does not, as the Ninth Circuit suggest, create
a “contrary presumption” against state action, nor is it “unworkably
complex.”230
The district court’s standard of liability is workable and
straightforward. Plaintiff tribes must “shoulder the initial burden” by
showing that the challenged actions, conducted either by the State or its
permitee, would proximately cause the degradation of fish habitat so that
the tribes would be unable to harvest enough fish to sustain their
moderate living needs.231 To satisfy their initial burden, tribes would be
required to make three showings. First, tribes would have to establish a
causal connection between the proposed action and the potential
degradation of an identifiable fishery. Courts are well equipped to make
the fact finding necessary to find a causal link between an action and its
impact on habitat.232 Second, tribes must establish that the identified
fishery affected by the action is within their usual and accustomed
fishing grounds. The tribes must develop an extensive record showing
that the fishery is within “‘location[s] where members of a tribe
customarily fish[] from time to time.’”233 Tribes do not need to prove the
grounds are “the primary or most productive ones,” only “that the site is
fished by members . . . on more than an extraordinary basis.”234 This fact
finding is the core of the Boldt Decision sub-proceedings, determining
the range of usual and accustomed fishing grounds.235 Third, tribes would
229. See supra notes 170-203, and accompanying text. These courts were
able to show the casual link between specific state, or state-permitted, actions and
the degradation of fisheries and their impingement and abrogation of treaty rights.
230. Washington IV, 649 F.2d at 1387-88.
231. Washington III, 506 F. Supp. at 208.
232. See supra notes 170-203, and accompanying text.
233. Nw. Sea Farmers, 931 F. Supp. at 1521 (quoting Boldt Decision,
384 F. Supp. at 332) (bracket in original).
234. Id.
235. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, Case No. C70-9213 RSM,
Subproceeding No. 05-04, 2013 WL 3897783 (W.D. Wash. July 29, 2013) (order on
mots. for sum. j. and mot. for declaratory j.), aff’d sub. nom, Tulalip Tribes v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 794 F.3d 1129 (9th Cir. 2015) (determining the usual and
accustomed fishing grounds of the Suquamish Tribe and the Tulalip Tribes); United
States v. Washington, Case No. C70-9213 RSM, Subproceeding No. 11-2, No. 2:11sp-00002-RSM (W.D. Wash. July 17, 2015) (order on mots. for sum. j.)
(determining the usual and accustomed fishing grounds of the Port Gamble
S’Klallam Tribe, the Lower Elwha Klallam Indian Tribe, and the Lummi Nation);
United States v. Washington, Case No. C70-9213 RSM, Subproceeding No. 09-01,
No. 2:70-cv-09213-RSM (W.D. Wash. July 9, 2015) (findings of fact and
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need to establish how much of the fish within the specific fishery are
needed to satisfy their moderate living needs.236 In Fishing Vessel, the
Supreme Court held that it was within “the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s exercise of
its discretion” to determine the “equitable measure” of fish allocated
from harvests within usual and accustomed grounds.237 The tribes must
show what percentage of the harvest from the specific fishery is required
to satisfy their moderate livings needs. Such a showing must be based
“upon proper submissions to the [d]istrict [c]ourt” and may vary “in
response to changing circumstances.”238 This standard has never been
found non-judiciable.239 Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s insistence, the
initial phase of litigation enforcing the implied right is not unworkably
complex.
Once tribes have made their showing that a State action would
affect their ability to satisfy their moderate living needs from a particular
usual and accustomed fishing ground, the burden shifts to the State to
rebut the tribes’ evidence. As it is the State’s burden to “demonstrate . . .
that the tribes’ needs may be satisfied by a lesser allocation, the State
must also bear the burden . . . to demonstrate that any environmental
degradation of the fish habitat proximately caused by the State’s actions .
. . will not impair the tribes’ ability to satisfy their moderate living
needs.”240 The State would be required to present significant scientific,
economic, and cultural evidence to satisfy their burden.241 However, as
indicated before, such complex cases are not uncommon in federal
court.242 The Ninth Circuit noted that district courts would have the

conclusions of law and mem. order) (determining the usual and accustomed fishing
grounds of the Makah Indian Tribe, the Quileute Indian Tribe, and the Quinault
Indian Nation).
236. See Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 686.
237. Id. at 685, 687.
238. Id. at 687. Of course, no amount of fish found necessary to satisfy
the moderate living requirement may exceed fifty percent of the fish harvested
within the specific fishery. Id. at 686.
239. See, e.g., Midwater Trawlers Coop. v. Dep’t of Commerce, 282
F.3d 710, 718-21 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming Fishing Vessel standard to determine the
Makah Tribe’s apportionment of Pacific whiting harvest); United States v.
Washington, 873 F. Supp. 1422, 1445-46 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, 157 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 1998) (determining that the fifty percent allocation of
sixteen tribes shellfish harvests did not need to be reduced under Fishing Vessel
standard); United States v. Washington, 774 F.2d 1470, 1475-81 (9th Cir. 1985)
(affirming district court allocation of salmon harvest based on Fishing Vessel).
240. Washington III, 506 F. Supp. at 208.
241. See id.
242. See specifically Culverts Case, 20 F. Supp. 3d 828.

2016

SALMON IS CULTURE, AND CULTURE IS SALMON

147

difficult task of determining causation and finding facts.243 District courts
are not estopped from exercising jurisdiction over cases merely because
fact finding in the particular case might be “difficult.” While the
determination of what satisfies the moderate living needs of a tribe might
be difficult, courts have been charged with making such determinations,
and have been able to do so.244
The standard of liability the district court established, and the
litigation necessary to prove a violation of the right, is necessarily
complex. The complexity of litigation, however, is not a bar to justice.
District courts have been able to determine the causal connection
between proposed state and state-permitted actions and habitat
degradation in litigation concerning the right to take fish. Indeed,
multiple district courts, in such cases as Muckleshoot Indian Tribe,
Northwest Sea Farmers, and the Culverts Case have been able to weave
their way though such “unworkably complex” standards of liability and
render judgments on particular actions that degraded fisheries and
infringed upon the treaty rights of tribes.
D. Non-Disproportionately Disruptive Effect
The Ninth Circuit’s final objection to the implied right was its
concern that the right to habitat protection would “potential[ly] . . .
243. See Washington IV, 694 F.2d at 1388.
244. The Ninth Circuit also worried that the implied right would “impose
upon the State the burden of providing to treaty Indians an income subsidy necessary
to assure their ‘moderate living needs.’” Id. While treaty-reserved hunting, fishing,
and gathering rights are valuable property interests, see COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra
note 25, at §18.07[6], 1199; cf. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381, courts have routinely
rejected the assertion that the treaties provide tribes with a cause of action for
monetary damages for injury to treaty-protected fish runs. See Nez Perce Tribe v.
Idaho Power Co., 847 F. Supp. 791 (D. Idaho 1994) (refusing, absent state cause of
action, to establish a new federal cause of action for monetary damages for injury to
treaty-protected fish runs. Id. at 813, 817); see also Skokomish Indian Tribe v.
United States, 410 F. 3d 506 (9th Cir. 2005 (en banc) (rejecting the assertion that
treaties conferred the Tribe “a right of action for equitable relief, let alone monetary
damages.” Id. at 514; compare cf. United States v. Pend Oreille Pub. Utility Dist.
No. 1, 28 F. 3d 1544 (9th Cr, 1994) (upholding monetary award as appropriate for
trespass damages to reservation lands from flooding caused by a dam. Id. at 1549-51.
The court also dismissed the Kalispell Tribe’s motion to amend its complaint to add
damages to treaty-reserved fishing and water rights only because the motion was
untimely. Id. at 1552-53). Scholars, nonetheless, have noted that Idaho Power Co.
“is at odds with the weight of authority acknowledging that treaty. . . fishing . . .
rights are property rights.” COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at § 18.04[2][g],
1177 (discussing Idaho Power Co., 847 F. Supp. 791).
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disrupt the existing state regulatory network . . . severely.” 245 The Ninth
Circuit saw the right to habitat protection as extending an “environmental
servitude” over “all State or State-authorized activities affecting the
environment, not just those involving the appropriative consumption of
water.”246 The court cautioned against “the prospect of frustrating
permittee expectations under state law” if it were to “accep[t] an
interpretation of the treaty embodying [such] an environmental
servitude.”247 This objection to the implied right fails to hold water as
treaties impose binding obligations on the State regardless of the
hardships imposed, and because the State is already engaged in extensive
habitat protection and restoration, disproving the argument that a treatybased obligation to do so would be overly burdensome.
Treaties impose binding obligations on all the parties. The State,
through its admission into the United States, is bound by the obligations
of the Stevens Treaties.248 It is not unreasonable, as an obligation under
the Stevens Treaties, to require the State to add to its permitting process
and environmental review an obligation to assess the impacts proposed
actions would have on traditional fisheries and treaty rights, and to
refrain from taking actions that would abrogate or impinge treatyreserved fishing rights. Treaties are “the supreme Law of the Land,” and
unless they are abrogated, qualified, or rescinded by Congress, their
obligations remain in full force and effect.249

245. Washington IV, 694 F.2d at 1388.
246. Id. at 1388-89 (emphasis removed).
247. Id. at 1389.
248. Boldt Decision, 384 F. Supp. at 331. “‘Valid treaties of course “are
as binding within the territorial limits of the States as they are elsewhere throughout
the dominion of the United States.”’” Id. (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S.
416, 434 (1920) (quoting Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 683 (1887))). “This
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . and all Treaties made or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST. art.
VI, cl. 2. “[The President] shall have the power, by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate, to make Treaties.” Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
249. Id. art. VI, cl. 2; COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 25, at § 5.01[2],
387-88; see Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). In “dealing with the
Indian Tribes by means of treaties, . . . of course, a moral obligation rested upon
Congress to act in good faith in performing stipulations entered into on its behalf.
But, as with treaties made with foreign nations . . . , the legislative power might pass
laws in conflict with treaties made with the Indians. . . . The [congressional] power
exists to abrogate the provisions of an Indian treaty.” Id. at 565-66 (internal citations
omitted).
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In 1989, Washington and the twenty-six federally recognized
tribes within the State signed the Centennial Accord, a commitment that
the State and the tribes would strive to “build confidence . . . in the[ir]
government-to-government relationship[s],” and to “work[] to resolve
issues of mutual concern.”250 Under the Centennial Accord, each
department of the State was required to issue its own implementation
plan, and committed to improving their government-to-government
relationships with tribes in Washington.251 In 1999, the State and the
tribes recommitted to the principles of the Centennial Accord by signing
the Millennium Agreement.252 Under the Millennium Agreement, the
State and the tribes recommitted to, among other things, strengthening
their government-to-government relationships, continuing to cooperate in
developing “enduring channels of communication,” developing
consultation processes, addressing issues of mutual concern, and
education.253 Importantly, following the Millennium Agreement, the
Washington State Department of Ecology (“DOE”)—the agency
responsible for permitting the Terminal—issued a revised Centennial
Accord Implementation Plan, recommitting to strengthen its governmentto-government relationships with tribes.254 The Implementation Plan
states that it is DOE’s “objective . . . to provide early notification and an
open invitation for consultation on all decisions that may affect tribal
rights and interests.”255 The Implementation Plan outlines specific
programs in which it has developed procedures to promote greater
“coordination and consultation with tribes,” including the “‘Permit
Assistance Handbook’ which serves as a citizen’s guide to environmental
permitting requirements,” and which “recognize[s] the unique
jurisdictional status of Indian reservations.”256 Throughout the
250. Centennial Accord Between the Federally Recognized Indian Tribes
in Washington State and the State of Washington art. III, IV, Aug. 4, 1989, available
at http://www.goia.wa.gov/Government-to-Government/Data/CentennialAccord.htm
[hereinafter Centennial Accord].
251. Id. art. IV.
252. Institutionalizing the Government-to-Government Relationship in
Preparation for the New Millennium, Nov. 4, 1999, available at http://www.goia.
wa.gov/Government-to-Government/Data/agreement.htm [hereinafter Millennium
Agreement].
253. Id.
254. DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, STATE OF WASH., WASHINGTON STATE
DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY CENTENNIAL ACCORD IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, available
at http://www.goia.wa.gov/govtogov/pdf/department%20of%20ecology.pdf (last
visited Oct. 5, 2015) [hereinafter IMPLEMENTATION PLAN].
255. Id. at 2.
256. Id. at 3-4.

150

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 37

Implementation Plan, the DOE reaffirms its commitment to working with
tribes in fulfillment of its broader charges,257 specifically, to “[p]rotect,
preserve[,] and enhance Washington’s environment for current and
future generations.”258 The overarching duty imposed by the implied
right to habitat protection does not prescribe an unreasonable burden on
the State. Instead, it reaffirms and codifies the obligations and
responsibilities already assumed by the State and articulated by the DOE,
and provides the Nation, along with other tribes, with a mechanism to
ensure the State fulfills its obligations.
Enforcing a treaty right obligating the State to review impacts of
proposed actions on traditional fisheries is not unreasonable in light of
the State’s preexisting obligations to perform environmental reviews
under the SEPA.259 Incorporating an analysis of impacts on tribal
fisheries into Environmental Impact Statements (“EIS”) required under
the SEPA would not “frustrate” the permitting process. Indeed, the SEPA
requires State agencies to coordinate their environmental review with
“any public agency [that] has jurisdiction by law or special expertise
with respect to any environmental impact involved.”260 The duty imposed
by the implied right to review the impacts of State actions on traditional
fisheries and to refrain from actions that degrade the fisheries and
abrogate the treaty right, would not significantly burden the operation of
state agencies, especially when considered in light of the DOE’s
commitment to tribal consultation and consideration of tribal interests.
Furthermore, in recent years, the State has taken proactive steps
to preserve and revitalize salmon habitat—including habitat in traditional
fishing grounds.261 The Nooksack River Watershed Recovery Plan, the
State’s guiding document for the recovery of the Nooksack River
watershed, which covers much of the Nation’s usual and accustomed

257. Id. passim.
258. Dep’t of Ecology, About, STATE OF WASH., http://www.ecy.wa.gov/
about.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2015).
259. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21C.030(c)(i)-(v).
260. Id. § 43.21C.030(d).
261. See specifically Puget Sound P’ship, Watershed Recovery Plans,
STATE OF WASH., http://www.psp.wa.gov/salmon-watershed-recovery-plans.php
(last visited Jan. 11, 2016). The State and the PSP have promulgated a watershed
recovery plan for each major watershed in Puget Sound, as part of the Puget Sound
Salmon Recovery Plan. See SHARED STRATEGY FOR PUGET SOUND, DRAFT PUGET
SOUND SALMON RECOVERY PLAN, VOL. 1 (Dec. 2005), available at http://www.psp.
wa.gov/salmon-watershed-recovery-plans.php (select “Download Puget Sound
Salmon Recovery Plan (Volume 1)”).
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fishing grounds, was authored by the State and the PSP in conjunction
with local municipalities and tribes, including the Nation.262
The primary goals of [the Nooksack River Watershed
Recovery Plan] are to protect properly functioning
habitats and restore and maintain to within the range of
natural variability the landscape processes that form
habitats to which wild salmonid stocks are adapted.263
Work done by the State has set in motion the preservation of fish habitat
throughout the Puget Sound watershed through the restoration of rivers,
tidal flats and estuaries, and river deltas, as well as upland restoration
projects. Recently, the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife
announced a sixteen million dollar project to remove levies and flood
farmland on Fir Island—a previously diked and drained marshland that
was once the delta of the Skagit River’s confluence with Puget Sound—
to restore salmon habitat.264 The project will create 131 acres of salmon
habitat, helping the State meet its goals in the 2005 Skagit Chinook
Recovery Plan.265 This project comes just years after the State completed
work to restore the nearby Fisher Slough wetland to support healthy
salmon habitat along the Skagit River.266
These and other projects’ successes require the cooperation of a
coalition of interested parties, including the federal government, the
State, tribes, local municipalities, private landowners, business, and
farmers. The stewardship in which the State is already engaged is proof
that tribes’ right to habitat protection would not impose an undue burden
262. PUGET SOUND P’SHIP, WATER RESOURCE INVENTORY AREA (WRIA)
1 SALMONID RECOVERY PLAN Appendix E: Salmon Habitat Restoration Strategy,
acknowledgements (June 10, 2005), available at http://www.psp.wa.gov/salmonwatershed-recovery-plans.php (under “Nooksack,” select “chapter download zip”)
[hereinafter NOOKSACK RIVER WATERSHED RECOVERY PLAN].
263. Id. at Appendix E: Salmon Habitat Restoration Strategy, 2.
264. Kimberly Cauvel, Fir Island Dike Setback Moves Forward, SKAGIT
VALLEY HAROLD (Mar. 23, 2015), available at http://www.goskagit.com/all_access/
fir-island-dike-setback-moves-forward/article_53869974-d6d0-5dc0-8a9a-97736175
1a9a.html.
265. Id; see PUGET SOUND P’SHIP, SKAGIT CHINOOK RECOVERY PLAN
2005 (2005), available at http://www.psp.wa.gov/salmon-watershed-recoveryplans.php (under “Skagit,” select “chapter download zip”).
266. Kimberly Cauvel, Fisher Slough: Successful Salmon Recovery
Becomes a Community Effort, SKAGIT VALLEY HERALD (Apr. 13, 2014), available at
http://www.goskagit.com/all_access/fisher-slough-successful-salmon-recoverybecomes-a-community-effort/article_b2f30bcf-f64e-5b05-a617-5457f3b8287c.html.
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on the State. Indeed, one of the “guiding principals” of the Nooksack
River Watershed Recovery Plan is to “[a]dhere to the principles of . . .
legal mandates pursuant to US v. Washington [sic] to ensure equitable
harvest sharing opportunit[ies] among tribes, and among treaty and nontreaty fishers” and to “[e]nsure [the] exercise of treaty reserved tribal
fishing rights.”267 While the Ninth Circuit cautioned of the right’s
“potential for disproportionately disrupting essential economic
development” within the State, the burden of incorporating a right to
habitat protection into the Stevens Treaties is in line with the
conservation and restoration policies the State already has in place.
As an example of how states can balance these competing
interests and duties, on August 18, 2014, the Oregon Department of State
Lands (“DSL”) refused to issue the final fill permit necessary to
construct the Coyote Island Terminal at the Port of Morrow on the
Columbia River.268 Among the top concerns emphasized by the DSL in
its letter denying the permit was the impact that the proposed terminal
would have on tribal fishing access and usual and accustomed fishing
grounds.269 The DSL found the traditional fishery located at the proposed
terminal site was “more significant than the public benefits that may be
derived from the proposed fill.”270 In light of the proposed terminal’s
impact on traditional fisheries, the DSL found that the proposed terminal
was “[in]consistent with the protection, conservation[,] and best use of
the water resource . . . and it would unreasonably interfere with the
paramount policy of [Oregon] to preserve the use of its waters for

267.

NOOKSACK RIVER WATERSHED RECOVERY PLAN, supra note 263, at

240.
268. DEP’T OF STATE LANDS, STATE OF OR., FINDINGS AND ORDER:
APPLICATION NO. 49123-RF, COYOTE ISLAND TERMINAL, LLC (Aug. 18, 2014),
available at http://www.oregon.gov/dsl/PERMITS/docs/cit_findings.pdf [hereinafter
FINDINGS AND ORDER]. The DSL’s determination is currently under administrative
appeal, and a contested case hearing will not be heard until sometime in late 2016.
DEP’T OF STATE LANDS, STATE OF OR., FACT SHEET: COYOTE ISLAND TERMINAL
PROJECT (PORT OF MORROW) REMOVAL-FILL PERMIT APPLICATION NO. APP0049123
3 (Nov. 23, 2015), available at http://www.oregon.gov/dsl/PERMITS/docs/fact_
sheet_coyote_island_terminal.pdf.
269. FINDINGS AND ORDER, supra note 269, at 8; see also Letter from
Brent H. Hall, Office of Legal Counsel, Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian
Reservation, to Charles P. Redon, Natural Res. Coordinator, Wetlands and
Waterways Conservation Div., Or. Dep’t of State Lands, Re: DSL December 3, 2013
Request for Further Information Regarding Application No. 49123-RF, Coyote
Island Terminal, LLC (Mar. 28, 2014), available at http://media.oregonlive.com/
opinion_impact/other/2014/06/april2letterfromdsl.pdf.
270. FINDINGS AND ORDER, supra note 269, at 3.
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navigation, fishing[,] and public recreation.”271 While the decision of the
DSL has no authority within Washington, it shows that states can give
greater weight to the preservation of tribal fishing rights and the
protection of traditional fisheries than to development projects that
would impair them.
The implied right to habitat protection provides tribes with a
mechanism by which they can enforce their treaty-reserved right to
harvest enough fish to provide them with a moderate living, by ensuring
that traditional fishery habitats are protected and continue to produce
salmon for tribes’ economic, spiritual, and cultural needs. As described
by the district court in 1980, the implied right to habitat protection is
consistent with—and carries out—State policy, while preserving and
protecting tribal interests.
V. CONCLUSION
On May 9, 2016, citing the “potential impacts to the Lummi
Nation’s usual and accustomed . . . fishing rights,” the Army Corps
rejected the permit application for the construction of the Terminal.272 A
month earlier, on April 1, 2016, SSA Marine, the majority owner behind
the Terminal project, suspended the environmental review of the project,
pending the Army Corps’s determination on whether the Terminal would
adversely impact treaty fishing rights.273 The Army Corps concluded that
the Terminal “would have a greater than de minimis impact on the
Lummi Tribe’s access to its usual and accustomed fishing grounds for
harvesting fish and shellfish.”274 The Army Corps’s rejection of the
permit application recognized the cultural importance of Xew’chi’eXen
and fishing to the Nation—and other costal tribes.275
271. Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
272. Army Corps Halts Gateway Pacific Terminal Permitting Process,
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS (May 9, 2016), http://www.nws.usace.army.mil/
Media/NewsReleases/tabid/2408/Article/754951/army-corps-halts-gateway-pacificterminal-permitting-process.aspx.
273. Puget Sound Coal Port Backers Pause Envronmental Review,
KUOW (Apr. 1, 2016), http://kuow.org/post/puget-sound-coal-port-backers-pauseenvrinmental-review
274. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: USUAL
AND ACCUSTOMED DE MINIMIS DETERMINATION 31 (May 9, 2016), available at
http://www.nws.usace.army.mil/Portals/27/docs/regulatory/NewsUpdates/160509M
FRUADeMinimisDetermination.pdf (emphasis in original).
275. Id. at 26 (“[i]t is also important to note the Cherry Point area is

known to the Lummi as Xwe’chi’eXen, which is part of a larger traditional
cultural property. Fishing in this area is important to the Lummi Schleangen
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The Army Corps’s rejection of the permit application, in effect,
ends the environmental reviews being conducted by the Army Corps, the
DOE, and Whatcom County.276 It had been the goal of each entity to
publish draft EISs by spring 2016,277 and final EISs by spring 2017.278 In
the Army Corps’s EIS scoping document, the Army Corps had identified
specific tribal treaty rights that may be impacted by the Gateway Pacific
terminal, including “impacts to (1) access to usual and accustomed
fishing grounds . . . , (2) fish runs and habitat, and (3) the Tribe’s ability
to meet moderate living needs.”279 The DOE’s and the County’s EISs
would not have include an examination of the potential impacts of the
Gateway Pacific export terminal on tribal treaty rights.280
In the intervening years since the Ninth Circuit’s opinions
revoking the interpretation of the Stevens Treaties to include an implied
right to habitat protection, new precedent has established the foundation
on which tribes may now push to reestablish the implied right. Over the
course of thirty-three years, the stepping-stones missing in 1982 have
been laid. The climate surrounding treaty-reserved fishing rights has
changed, as have attitudes towards tribal involvement in policy decisions
concerning fisheries protection and restoration. Over fishing,
development within fisheries, pollution, and climate change are all
pushing Washington’s historic salmon runs to the brink of extinction.
While the challenges confronting tribes in the face of the declining
salmon fisheries are unique to tribes, the State can play a critical role in
preserving traditional fisheries along with its own commercial ones.
Existing State laws and policies concerning permitting, planning, and
environmental review, restoration, and preservation, provide a platform
on which the implied right can be incorporated.
(Way of Life), in addition to being part of the Lummi’s U&A relied on for
commercial or subsistence fishing”) (internal citions omitted, emphasis in
original).
276. See EISs for the Proposed Gateway Pacific Terminal and Custer
Spur Projects are Underway, GATEWAY PAC. TERMINAL EIS, http://www.eisgateway
pacificway.gov (last visited Apr. 23, 2015).
277. Id.
278. Dep’t of Ecology, Gateway Pacific Terminal at Cherry Point
Proposal, STATE OF WASH., http://www.ecy.wa.gov/geographic/gatewaypacific/ (last
visited Apr. 23, 2015).
279. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD,
CENWS-OD-RG (July 3, 2013), available at http://www.nws.usace.army.mil/Portal
s/27/docs/regulatory/News/SCOPEMFRGATEWAYBNSF.pdf (emphasis added).
280. See WASH. STATE DEP’T OF ECOLOGY, FAQ ON SCOPE OF EIS
STUDIES FOR GATEWAY PACIFIC TERMINAL/CLUSTER SPUR (GPT) 4 (Fed. 13, 2014),
available at http://www.ecy.wa.gov/geographic/gatewaypacific/gpt-faq.pdf.
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The climate is shifting, and momentum is swinging in favor of
the reestablishment of the implied right. The reestablishment of the
implied right will take tenacity, unwavering determination, and profound
patience; yet, it would stand as a lasting testament to the generations who
fought tirelessly for Native rights, treaty rights, and the preservation of
Native culture.
“It is equally beyond doubt that the existence of an environmentallyacceptable habitat is essential to the survival of the fish, without which
the expressly-reserved right to take fish would be meaningless and
valueless.”281

281.

Washington III, 506 F. Supp. at 205.

